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     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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     SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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                                             23 Cr. 10 (AS)
                V.
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     AVRAHAM EISENBERG,
6
                    Defendant.
                                             Trial
           -----x
 7
                                             New York, N.Y.
 8
                                             April 18, 2024
                                             9:30 a.m.
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     Before:
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                          HON. ARUN SUBRAMANIAN,
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                                             District Judge
                                              -and a jury-
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                               APPEARANCES
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     DAMIAN WILLIAMS,
          United States Attorney for the
          Southern District of New York
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     PETER J. DAVIS
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     THOMAS S. BURNETT
     TIAN HUANG
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          Assistant United States Attorneys
     WAYMAKER LLP
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          Attorneys for Defendant
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     BRIAN E. KLEIN
     ASHLEY MARTABANO
21
     RILEY SMITH
          -and-
22
     TALKIN MUCCIGROSSO & ROBERTS, LLP
     SANFORD N. TALKIN
23
     NOAM B. GREENSPAN
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     Also Present: Brandon Racz, FBI
                    Ryan Sears, Paralegal Specialist-USAO
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                    Jonathan Oshinsky, Paralegal Specialist-USAO
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(Deliberations resumed; jury not present)

THE COURT: All right. So the Court has received a note from the jury dated today, and at 10:46 a.m., which reads:

On page 28, can you define "pretense, representation, or promise."

I make this part of the record as Court Exhibit D.

The Court has furnished the parties with the note.

Mr. Burnett or whoever is taking this on on the defense side, have you had a chance to consider the note and do you have any proposal on how to respond.

MR. BURNETT: We do, your Honor.

So we've considered the note. So our concern about answering it directly and just, like, defining these three terms for them is that we think that doing so would be based on a legally incorrect premise.

So the key case here is, I think, U.S. v. McNally, which I have the cite, I believe, if you need it. It is 483

U.S. And I think the relevant -- no, no, this is not the right thing. Sorry. It is 459 F.3d 154. I'm sorry, I'm looking at U.S. v. Males from the Second Circuit. McNally also bears on this, but I think we should take it Males than McNally in the way to think about this.

And what the Second Circuit says in *Males*, beginning at page 156, but primarily on page 157, is that it's wrong to treat the wire fraud statute as kind of being read in the

disjunctive, where it's like a scheme to defraud or for obtaining property by false pretenses, representations, or a promise.

And to kind of embody that idea, the jury instruction that the Court approved is in the block quote on 157, which is that: The wire fraud statute covers any device or course of action that deprives another of money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises. It is, in other words, a plan to deprive another of money or property by trick, deceit, deception, swindle, or overreaching.

So we think that "in other words" is what is clarifying the meaning of scheme to defraud, including a scheme to defraud by false pretenses, representations, or promises.

The other concern we have with giving too specific a definition comes from  $U.S.\ v.\ McNally$ , which the citation there is 483 U.S. 357.

THE COURT: Can you give me that cite again.

MR. BURNETT: 483 U.S. 357.

And there, the Supreme Court, in discussing an older opinion called *Durland v. United States*, explained that it's historically been wrong to construe the wire fraud statute as reaching something that would only, say, come under the common-law definition of a term like "false pretenses"; and instead is construed to "include everything designed to defraud by representations as to the past or present, or suggestions

and promises as to the future."

So I think this all goes to say that the instruction the government would propose to the jury is not to define the three specific terms, but rather to give another instruction about the meaning of scheme or artifice to defraud or obtain money by false or fraudulent pretenses using the same language that the Second Circuit approved in *McNally* and the Supreme Court used in *Durland*.

And we have a paragraph to propose whenever the Court is ready, unless you have questions before I propose it.

THE COURT: All right.

What is the additional instruction?

MR. BURNETT: The wire fraud statute charged in Count Three prohibits any scheme or artifice to defraud or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises. This means it prohibits any plan to deprive another of money or property by trick, deceit, deception, swindle, or overreaching. It includes everything designed to defraud by representations as to the past or present or suggestions and promises as to the future.

THE COURT: Okay. So you're taking the language in those two cases and merging them together to provide additional guidance to the jury.

MR. BURNETT: That's correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

And what is the defense's response? Are you in agreement with the government as to that proposed addition?

MR. GREENSPAN: Your Honor, everything up to the last few words in the government's instruction is already in the Court's instruction, including the --

THE COURT: It is literally the language that follows the three words that have been provided.

MR. GREENSPAN: Follows and precedes, yes.

THE COURT: The phrasing might be different; it might not end with a period. But I think "in other words," and then that part of it is there.

MR. GREENSPAN: Correct.

So our concern is not that the government's instruction is legally wrong — we don't have a problem with that. But we're not sure that it answers the jury's question or helps the jury complete their function.

And so our proposal was to actually define the terms using either *Black's* or dictionary definitions that the parties hopefully could agree to. We don't think that either *Males* or *McNally* prohibits that given the sections we saw. It doesn't suggest that they have to be read conjunctively or disjunctively, it just defines them.

THE COURT: Okay. What is your proposal?

MR. GREENSPAN: We would propose defining "pretense"

as a calculated act representing facts; "representation" as a statement made to influence an action; and "promise" as a declaration of what one will do.

THE COURT: Do you have an objection to providing those definitions along with the instruction that the government proposed?

MR. GREENSPAN: No, we wouldn't object to that.

THE COURT: Okay.

Mr. Burnett, if I were to provide the guidance that you — or the instruction as you proposed it, and then add in the defendant's definitions of those three terms, the position being that while the common—law understandings of these terms were perhaps foreclosed by these precedents, simply giving the jury the dictionary definition of the three terms that they asked about would be helpful to the jury and would not seem inconsistent with the further guidance that the government has proposed.

MR. BURNETT: So the only reason I'm pausing is just that I haven't had the time to like actually research like the legal definitions of some of these terms. And the particular one that I'm hung up on is "representation," which I think the way defense had defined it is limited to a statement. And I don't think — at least like in the common—sense use of the term, "representation" is limited to statements. Like you can misrepresent something any number of ways. So it could be like

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if we modified that to a statement or act --

THE COURT: Why don't you take like ten minutes, and then why don't we come back, and then we can see if we -- the parties should talk and see if there's a combined response to the note that both sides would be comfortable with. I think the parties are coming up with a framework that may work. You need a little time to just think about this, but not too much time.

So let's come back at 11:45 and see if we've got a proposal we can take back to the jury.

MR. BURNETT: Thank you.

(Recess)

THE COURT: All right. What have you got?

MR. BURNETT: All right. So we actually just hit "send" on an email to you. We have an instruction that we have an agreement on everything, except for one sentence, which I've highlighted in the email.

THE COURT: The highlighted sentence is: "As I have instructed you, the wire fraud statute is not limited to false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises."

MR. BURNETT: That's correct.

THE COURT: I take it that's a suggestion from the government that the defense disagrees with.

MR. BURNETT: That's right.

THE COURT: Okay.

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And why wouldn't that -- doesn't that reintroduce a form of the disjunctive issue that we get out of Males, that Males said, Look, we don't look at this disjunctively. And by saying that, it is not limited -- so you're trying to reinforce Males -- let me just make sure I have this right. You're trying to reinforce Males by making sure that the jury does not have the misimpression from this instruction, this additional instruction, that liability is limited to false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, because that would be the type of disjunctive understanding that Males foreclosed; is that correct?

MR. BURNETT: That's right.

Our view is that wire fraud covers schemes to defraud, it covers schemes by false pretenses, representations, or promises; and it shouldn't be -- they shouldn't be focused on just like one piece of it under Males. The conjunctive/disjunctive often is like used more to describe whether the, like, object as property applies to both scheme to defraud and false or pretenses. But the basic point is that this covers broad -- sweeps more broadly than just the pretenses, representations, or promises because of the scheme-to-defraud language. And this captures that.

THE COURT: So I guess my question really is why is that necessary given the first paragraph which the government proposed, which makes sure that the jury understands in the

last two sentences that this means it prohibits any plan to deprive another of money or property by trick, deceit, deception, swindle, or overreaching; it includes everything designed to defraud by representations as to the past or present or suggestions and promises as to the future. That would seem to be consistent with both *Males* and *McNally*. It is consistent, that's why you proposed it.

And then the only thing that we're really adding is to provide definitions of the three words so that the jury, if they didn't literally understand what those three words meant, they would have some basis for understanding of those three words. However, it would not say that they would have to find those particular three things to have happened — one of them — in order to find liability; in fact, that would be inconsistent with what is said in the prior paragraph.

MR. BURNETT: I think if we were starting on a blank slate, we wouldn't think we needed this sentence, your Honor. I think our concern was that they have like focused in on these three works as sort of the talisman for the statute; so the extra sentence is legally correct and sort of helps reinforce that point. But I agree that the first paragraph serves the function.

THE COURT: Okay.

So I'm going to deliver this additional instruction without the highlighted sentence, if the defense wants to be

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further heard on this.
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               MR. KLEIN: Your Honor, thank you.
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               Just I would take out the word "however."
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               MR. BURNETT: That makes sense.
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               MR. KLEIN: You can just say "I can provide."
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               THE COURT: Yes.
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                      So let me make sure that I have this right.
               And do the parties have a view on whether this should
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      be delivered back in writing or whether we should bring the
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      jury out? Does it make a difference to either side?
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               MR. BURNETT: Because they have the instructions back
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      there in writing already, I figure it might make sense to just
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      give it to them.
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               MR. GREENSPAN: We agree with that.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
               So we'll send this back with a letter from the Court.
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               So the letter will read: "Dear Jury: In response to
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      your question, the Court further instructs you as follows:
               "The wire fraud statute charged in Count Three
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      prohibits any scheme or artifice to defraud or for obtaining
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     money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
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      representations, or promises. This means it prohibits any plan
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      to deprive another of money or property by trick, deceit,
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      deception, swindle, or overreaching. It includes everything
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designed to defraud by representations as to the past or

present or suggestions and promises as to the future. 1 2 "I can provide the following definitions: "A pretense is a calculated act representing facts; a 3 4 representation is a statement, whether verbal or written, or an 5 act made to influence an action; a promise is a declaration or 6 a pledge to do or refrain from doing the thing specified." 7 So we'll give that back. Any objections from the defense to providing that 8 9 additional instruction? 10 MR. GREENSPAN: No, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Any issues from the government? 12 MR. BURNETT: No, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Okay. So we'll put that in a letter. 14 We'll provide it to the parties in advance just in case we've made any mistakes, and then we'll have that sent 15 16 back to the jury. 17 All right. Thank you very much. 18 (Recess pending verdict) 19 THE COURT: All right. We have a note from the jury 20 that they have reached a verdict. 21 Anything to address before we bring the jury in? 22 MR. DAVIS: No, your Honor. 23 MR. KLEIN: No, your Honor. 24 THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Hernandez, let's bring in the jury.

1 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Yes, your Honor. 2 (Jury present) THE COURT: Please be seated. 3 4 Members of the jury, we have received your most recent 5 note stating that you have reached a verdict from 12:30 p.m. 6 I'll ask the foreperson, is that Juror No. 5? 7 FOREPERSON: Yes. THE COURT: Have you reached a verdict? 8 FOREPERSON: Yes, we have, your Honor. 9 10 THE COURT: Can you please provide the verdict form to 11 Mr. Hernandez. 12 Mr. Hernandez, can you please get the form. 13 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Yes, your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Mr. Hernandez, can you please provide the 15 form back to the foreperson. 16 To the foreperson, Mr. Hernandez will inquire as to 17 the verdict, and then we'll go through each of the jurors to 18 ensure that the verdict is each one of your verdicts. 19 Mr. Hernandez, you may proceed. 20 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Yes, your Honor. 21 Can I ask the foreperson to please rise. 22 In the matter of United States of America v. Avraham 23 Eisenberg, case number 23 Cr. 10, the verdict form, reading Count One, commodities fraud. 24 25 Does the jury find the defendant guilty or not guilty

1 on Count One? 2 FOREPERSON: Guilty. THE DEPUTY CLERK: Proceeding to the next section. 3 4 If you find a verdict of guilty as to Count One, 5 please select which of the three acts you find that the 6 defendant committed. You may select more than one, but all 7 jurors must agree on each act selected. No. 1: Use or employ or attempt to use or employ any 8 9 manipulative device, scheme, or artifice to defraud. 10 Does the jury select option one, yes or no? 11 FOREPERSON: Yes. 12 THE DEPUTY CLERK: No. 2: Make or attempt to make any 13 untrue or misleading statement of a material fact or to omit to 14 state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 15 made not true -- made not untrue or misleading. Does the jury select option two, yes or no? 16 17 FOREPERSON: No. 18 THE DEPUTY CLERK: No. 3: Engage or attempt to engage 19 in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 20 would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 21 Does the jury select option three, yes or no? 22 FOREPERSON: Yes. 23 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Count Two, commodities 24 manipulation.

On Count Two, does the jury find the defendant guilty

1	or not guilty?
2	FOREPERSON: Guilty.
3	THE DEPUTY CLERK: Continuing on Count Two, attempted
4	commodities manipulation.
5	Does the jury find the defendant guilty or not guilty?
6	FOREPERSON: Guilty.
7	THE DEPUTY CLERK: And Count Three, wire fraud.
8	Does the jury find the defendant guilty or not guilty?
9	FOREPERSON: Guilty.
10	THE DEPUTY CLERK: Thank you.
11	The foreperson may be seated.
12	I'm going to poll the jury, ask if this is their true
13	verdict, starting with Juror No. 1.
14	Juror No. 1, is this your verdict?
15	JUROR: Yes.
16	THE DEPUTY CLERK: Thank you.
17	Juror No. 2, is this your verdict?
18	JUROR: Yes.
19	THE DEPUTY CLERK: Juror No. 3, is this your verdict?
20	JUROR: Yes.
21	THE DEPUTY CLERK: Juror No. 4, is this your verdict?
22	JUROR: Yes.
23	THE DEPUTY CLERK: Juror No. 5, is this your verdict?
24	JUROR: Yes.
25	THE DEPUTY CLERK: Juror No. 6, is this your verdict?

1	JUROR: Yes.
2	THE DEPUTY CLERK: Juror No. 7, is this your verdict?
3	JUROR: Yes.
4	THE DEPUTY CLERK: Juror No. 8, is this your verdict?
5	JUROR: Yes.
6	THE DEPUTY CLERK: Can you repeat that please?
7	JUROR: Yes.
8	THE DEPUTY CLERK: Thank you.
9	Juror No. 9, is this your verdict?
10	JUROR: Yes.
11	THE DEPUTY CLERK: Juror No. 10, is this your verdict?
12	JUROR: Yes.
13	THE DEPUTY CLERK: Juror No. 11, is this your verdict?
14	JUROR: Yes.
15	THE DEPUTY CLERK: And Juror No. 12, is this your
16	verdict?
17	JUROR: Yes.
18	THE DEPUTY CLERK: The verdict is unanimous, your
19	Honor.
20	THE COURT: All right.
21	Counsel, is there any reason that I cannot now dismiss
22	the jury?
23	MR. DAVIS: No, your Honor.
24	MR. TALKIN: No, your Honor.
25	THE COURT: All right.

Ladies and gentlemen, in a moment I'm going to excuse you, which means that, among other things, the restrictions that you've been operating under — namely, that you cannot talk to anyone about the case and that you can't research the case — will no longer apply. So you may do those things.

Let me say one thing on that score. It's up to you whether you wish to speak with anyone. This is a case that now that I can, I will tell you, has gotten some press. So it's possible that members of the press will ask you — ask to speak with you. It's entirely up to you whether you choose to speak to them or not. My own personal recommendation is that you not, in part because our jury system has long been based on the notion that what happens in the jury room, stays in the jury room. And in that regard, I think there's an important reason to respect the privacy of your deliberations. But it is entirely up to you.

What I will ask is that if you do speak with the press or anyone about this case and your involvement in it, that you respect the privacy of your fellow jurors' deliberations and views. In that regard, what happens in the jury room should stay in the jury room, but you can speak about your own views about the case, but don't speak about what your colleagues' views were or the deliberations. But at the end of the day, it's up to you what you wish to do on that score.

I want to really thank all of you for all your hard

work, your patience, and your dedication here. I know that you've given up a lot to be here for the last two weeks, and it's taken a tremendous sacrifice, but it's also very inspiring to all of us. So on behalf of the parties, the court staff and, most of all, me, I want to really thank you for your service here these past two weeks.

Now, if you're willing to wait -- I know you've been deliberating for a while, you've been here for two weeks, and if you need to get out of here, I would totally respect that. But I have to handle a few matters with the parties. But after that, I'd love to come back into the jury room and personally thank you and see if you have any questions, happy to answer them, and to really thank you personally for all the hard work and sacrifice that you've put in.

So with that, I will excuse you for a second to the jury room, and then I'll be back there. Just give me about five minutes.

Thank you very much.

All rise for the jury.

(Jury discharged)

THE COURT: Please be seated.

Okay. I'll hear the parties' views, but I'll send -I'm going to set a sentencing date for July 29th at 2:30 p.m.

In accordance with my individual rules and practices, the defense submissions are due two weeks prior to sentencing;

the government's submissions are due one week prior to 1 2 sentencing. I'll direct the government to provide its 3 statement of the offense to probation within seven days, and 4 defense counsel must arrange for the defendant to be 5 interviewed within the next two weeks. 6 The deadlines under the rules for any pretrial --7 post-trial motions, if there is any request to extend those, you should confer with one another and make a request. But 8 9 until I say otherwise, the deadlines are whatever the rules 10 provide for.

With that, anything further from the government?

MR. DAVIS: No, your Honor. Thank you.

Anything further from the defense? THE COURT:

MR. TALKIN: No. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thanks to both sides for a very well-tried case. I really appreciate it.

Thank you very much. We are adjourned.

(Trial concluded)

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